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Case No. 20090911-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Timothy Michael Howard, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
State's Reply Brief 
The State responds as follows to the arguments raised in Defendant's brief. 
THE SENTENCE WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT FELL OUTSIDE THE 
AUTHORIZED STATUTORY RANGE 
Defendant argues that the State did not preserve its challenge to the illegal 
sentence below. Br. Aple. 3-4. He contends that preservation was necessary because 
the sentence was not, in fact, illegal. Id. at 3-5. The State's argument was preserved. 
But even it were not, the sentence was illegal and, therefore, may be corrected at 
anytime, whether or not preserved. 
A, The challenge to the illegal sentence was preserved. 
Defendant states that the prosecutor "mentioned" during the sentencing 
hearing that he was recommending that Defendant's sentence include "the 90 day 
jail term as laid out by the statute/' Br. Aple. 3. The prosecutor, however, expressly 
stated to the trial court that the 90-day jail term was mandatory under the statute. 
Defendant's counsel below first acknowledged the 90-day statutory requirement, 
but asked the court not to impose it.1 See T:56, 7-9. In his response, the prosecutor 
reminded the trial court that"there [is] the mandatory 90 day jail sentence for the 
sex offender registration violation/, T:16. 
Defendant nevertheless contends—without citing any authority—that the 
prosecutor "invited" any error in the sentence by not objecting to it after the trial 
court imposed it. Br. Aple. 3-4. Defendant misapprehends both the preservation 
rules and the invited error doctrine. 
"One of the purposes in requiring objections is to bring all claimed errors to 
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if 
appropriate." VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distrib., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 
(Utah App. 1988). Thus, the objection "must be specific enough to put the trial court 
on notice of every error which is complained of on appeal." Id. at 964-65. 
1
 Defense counsel referenced the requirement by stating that "all the 
arguments that Mr. Cramer just made about the 90 days is very appropriate in this 
case, it is a situation, it's a little bit different." T:5. Counsel was referring to an 
argument that Mr. Cramer, Defendant's appellate counsel, had just made in a 
sentencing hearing in State v. Dana, Case No. 20090910-C^\, that the mandatory 90-
day jail term was unconstitutional. The State has also appealed the trial court's 
refusal to impose the required statutory term in that case. By motion filed today, the 
State is asking the Court to consolidate this appeal with Dana and with State v. 
Williams, Case No. 20090908-CA—another State's appeal raising the same issue— 
for purposes of decision and argument, if held. 
2 
The prosecutor put the trial court on timely and specific notice of any 
potential error when he informed the trial court, before sentence was imposed, that 
the statute mandated a minimum 90-day incarceration period. T:4. Once the 
prosecutor did so, the primary purpose of the preservation rule was fulfilled. The 
prosecutor was not required to repeat that information after the trial court, having 
been expressly alerted to the mandatory sentence, chose to ignore it. 
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's argument, merely "[f]ailing to object'' is 
not "typically considered as invited error." Br. Aple. 3. Rather, the invited error 
doctrine applies only when a party leads a trial court into error by "'affirmatively 
representing] to the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the 
[proceedings].'" Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, % 16, 164 P.3d 366 (quoting State v. 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14, 128 P.3d 1171). Here, as Defendant concedes, the 
prosecutor did not affirmatively represent that the trial court could or should 
impose something less than the statutorily-mandated jail term. Rather, the 
prosecutor affirmatively informed the court of its obligation to impose the 
mandated jail term. Thus, the prosecutor did not invite any error. 
3 
B. The sentence was illegal because it did not comply with statutory 
requirements. 
But whether or not the issue was preserved, this Court may address a claim of 
an illegal sentence for the first time on appeal. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859-60 
(Utah 1995); see also State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993-94 (Utah 1989) ("Babbel J") 
(addressing State's claim of illegal sentence raised for first time at oral argument on 
appeal). This is true even when the prosecutor agrees to the illegal sentence in the 
trial court. See State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 86 (Utah 1991) ('Babbel II") (approving 
reversal of illegal sentence, even though error resulted from both prosecutor and 
defense counsel misinforming trial court of applicable sentence). 
Defendant acknowledges that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time 
under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but contends that the sentence 
here was not illegal. Br. Aple. 4. Defendant argues that to be illegal, a sentence 
must be "patently" or "manifestly" illegal. Br. Aple. 4 (citing State v. Garner, 2008 
UT App 32, If 17, 177 P.3d 637). Defendant argues that to be "patently" or 
"manifestly" illegal, the sentence must be "beyond the authorized statutory range." 
Id. Defendant reasons that because the sentence here was "below" the statutory 
minimum, instead of "beyond" the statutory maximum, his sentence was not 
"patently" or "manifestly" illegal. Id. 
4 
Defendant cites no authority to support his logic. Nor could he. The Utah 
Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a sentence less than that mandated by 
statute is an illegal sentence because it does "not comply with the requirements of" 
the statute. Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87 n.l. Babbel was convicted of crimes that, at the 
time, carried minimum-mandatory prison terms. Id. at 86. The trial court 
nevertheless imposed indeterminate prison terms because "both the defense 
attorney and the prosecutor indicated to the judge that a minimum mandatory term 
was inapplicable." Id. at 86. On appeal, the State asserted for the first time "at oral 
argument that Babbel's sentences were unlawful." Id. After affirming Babbel's 
convictions, the Utah Supreme Court "vacated his sentences and remanded for 
resentencing because of the clear error in the original sentences." Id. 
On remand, Babbel received more severe minimum-mandatory sentences. Id. 
at 86-87. Babbel appealed, arguing that the harsher sentences violated double 
jeopardy and Utah statutory law. Id. at 87. In rejecting Babbel's second appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that the initial "sentences were illegal because they 
did not comply with the requirements of [the applicable statutes]." Id. at 87 n.l. 
Likewise, Defendant's sentence here does not "comply with the requirements 
of" the applicable statute. His sentence, therefore, was illegal and must be 
corrected. 
5 
Although not clear, Defendant seems to suggest that the State may prevail 
only if it shows that "the trial court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence it 
imposed/' Br. Aple. 4-5. Defendant asserts that "in order to get relief under rule 
22(e)," the State must show that his sentence was "unconstitutional." Br. Aple. 5. 
Babbel II, however, clearly holds that a sentence is illegal under rule 22(e) 
when it does not comply with statutory requirements. Babbel II, 813 P.2d at 88. 
There is no requirement that the sentence also be unconstitutional. See id. 
Moreover, the issue here is not whether the trial court had "jurisdiction" to impose 
the illegal sentence. Rather, the issue is whether statute authorized the sentence 
imposed. See id. As the Utah Supreme Court explained, while "an unlawful 
sentence [is] void," the jurisdiction of the trial court "continue[s] until a valid 
sentence [is] imposed." Id. Indeed, the trial court "has this power at any time, 
whether before or after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal." Id. 
In sum, the sentence in this case was illegal because it did not comply with the 
statutorily-mandated jail time. The sentence, therefore, must be vacated and the 
case remanded for the trial court to impose a legal sentence. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse and remand for 
imposition of a legal sentence. 
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